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Cultivating a Relationship That Works: Cyber-
Vigilantism and the Public Versus Private Inquiry 
of Cyber-Predator Stings∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation saw a 2062 percent increase 
over the last decade in open cases initiated through its Innocent Images 
National Initiative.1  The FBI Initiative combats all aspects of computer-
based attacks on children, including catching sexual predators online.2  
Access to the Internet has increased tremendously over the last decade.3  
As a result, the Initiative has expanded to twenty-eight FBI field offices4 
and has “secure[d] nearly 3,000 convictions.”5 
The above-mentioned statistics show that online predation against 
children is one of the most troubling trends in the digital age.6  J. Allan 
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 1. FBI, Innocent Images National Initiative, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/innocent.htm 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (noting that opened cases rose from 113 to 2443 between 1996 and 
2007).  “The Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI), a component of FBI’s Cyber Crimes 
Program, is an intelligence driven, proactive, multi-agency investigative operation to combat the 
proliferation of child pornography/child sexual exploitation (CP/CSE) facilitated by an online 
computer.”  Id. 
 2. See id. (discussing the Initiative’s focus on online exploitation of children, child 
pornographers, those possessing child pornography, as well as predators’ online efforts to engage in 
sexual activity with a minor). 
 3. Przemyslaw Paul Polański, CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE INTERNET: IN THE SEARCH FOR A 
SUPRANATIONAL CYBERSPACE LAW, at VII–IX (Aernout H.J. Schmidt et al. eds., Information 
Technology and Law Series No. 13, 2007).  According to recent estimates, there are 1,463,632,361 
Internet users worldwide, roughly 20% of the world’s population.  World Internet Usage Statistics 
News and World Population Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 
2008).  The number reaches an astounding 73.6% of the North American population alone.  Id. 
 4. FBI, Ten Years of Protecting Our Children: Cracking Down on Sexual Predators on the 
Internet, Dec. 2, 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec03/online120203.htm. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See J. Allan Cobb, Evidentiary Issues Concerning Online “Sting” Operations: A 
Hypothetical-Based Analysis Regarding Authentication, Identification, and Admissibility of Online 
Conversations—A Novel Test for the Application of Old Rules to New Crimes, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 
785, 786–87 (2001). 
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Cobb illustrated the enormity of the situation by comparing children on 
the Internet to “young zebra on the plains of the Serengeti—stalked from 
the fringes by big game predators.”7  Susan Brenner and Leo Clarke 
argue that the legal community faces a real dilemma in regards to 
cybercrime.8  Specifically, Brenner and Clarke posit that “[c]ybercrime 
raises new and difficult challenges for a society’s need to maintain 
internal order; the challenges arise not from the need to adopt new law 
criminalizing the activity at issue, but from law enforcement’s ability to 
react to it.”9  This Comment addresses the challenge of integrating 
private-party participation in law enforcement into legally acceptable 
investigative techniques.10 
As evidenced by the FBI Initiative and other law enforcement 
programs, one solution to this problem has been the online sting.11  
Justification for this tactic is not hard to find.  In Justice Roberts’s 
dissenting opinion in the seminal entrapment case of Sorrells v. United 
States,12 he comments: 
 Society is at war with the criminal classes, and courts have 
uniformly held that in waging this warfare the forces of prevention and 
detection may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of 
the commission of crime.  Resort to such means does not render an 
indictment thereafter found a nullity nor call for the exclusion of 
evidence so procured.13 
National awareness of cyber-pedophilia grew tremendously with the 
premiere of a Dateline NBC series: “To Catch a Predator.”14  Cloaked in 
anonymity online, predators were unceremoniously unmasked in front of 
the viewing audience by Dateline host Chris Hansen.15  The show boasts 
                                                          
 7. Id. at 787. 
 8. See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security: Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 666 (2005). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 674. 
 11. See Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt 
Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 477 (2004) (stating that “Internet sting operations to catch adults 
preying on children have grown as exponentially as the public’s use of the Internet”). 
 12. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 13. Id. at 453–54 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part). 
 14. See Steve Thompson, Murphy, NBC Stung by Criticism of Sex-Predator Cases, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007, at 1A; see also Chris Hansen, Reflections On ‘To Catch a 
Predator,’ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17601568 (last visited Aug. 27, 2008) (stating that host 
Chris Hansen has even testified in front of Congress to bring this problem to light). 
 15. See Luke Dittrich, Tonight on Dateline This Man Will Die, ESQUIRE, Sept. 2007, at 235 
(stating that when a would-be-predator arrives at the decoy house, “Chris Hansen confronts him with 
a printout of . . . [the] chat transcripts” and upon leaving the house “local cops . . . arrest him and 
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a large number of convictions and has raised awareness of a major 
problem.16  However, “To Catch a Predator” has also faced its share of 
skepticism.17 
In his article, The Shame Game, Douglas McCollam argues that 
“Dateline hasn’t so much covered a story as created one.”18  According 
to McCollam, one of the most troubling aspects of the show is Dateline 
NBC’s relationship with its “decoys,” Perverted Justice.19  Perverted 
Justice is a watchdog group with a stated purpose of creating a “chilling-
effect” in chat-rooms so that would-be pedophiles will think twice about 
inducing minors into sexual encounters.20  Perverted Justice contracts 
with Dateline NBC to conduct the stings depicted on the program.21  In 
some documented instances, Perverted Justice was also deputized by law 
enforcement,22 while at the same time allegedly receiving a “consulting 
fee” of $100,000 from the show.23  “To Catch a Predator” host, Chris 
Hansen, asserts that the show and law enforcement run parallel 
investigations24 with an impenetrable “Chinese wall”;25 however, the 
above-mentioned facts seemingly contradict this assertion.  McCollam 
states, “[I]t is clearly a [journalistic] no-no, even at this late date in the 
devolution of TV news, to directly pay government officials or police 
officers.”26  When Perverted Justice is deputized, the conflicts of interest 
are evident.  To Perverted Justice’s credit, when not working for the 
show, it works with local law enforcement for free.27 
The legal issues at the heart of “To Catch a Predator” have largely 
been ignored due to the fact that most suspects just plead guilty.28  One 
man caught in a Dateline sting, however, “has launched [an] aggressive 
                                                                                                                       
charge him with online solicitation of a minor”). 
 16. See Douglas McCollam, The Shame Game, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.–Feb. 2007, at  
28, 30 (“To date, by the show’s own count, it has netted 238 would-be predators . . . . Hansen 
regularly gives talks to schools and parents groups . . . and he was even summoned to Washington to 
testify before a congressional subcommittee investigating the problem . . . .”) 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at 33. 
 19. Id. at 31–32. 
 20. Perverted-Justice.com, http://www.perverted-justice.com/index.php?pg=faq (follow “What 
is the goal of Perverted-Justice.com? A.+” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
 21. Dittrich, supra note 15, at 235. 
 22. John Simerman, TV Show on Trial along with Suspect, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2007, at A1. 
 23. McCollam, supra note 16, at 31. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Perverted-Justice.com, Information Sharing Agreements, http://www.perverted-justice.com 
/?pg=policeinfo (follow “Info for Police” hyerlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
 28. Simerman, supra note 22, at A1. 
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fight” in court.29  Dr. Maurice Wolin, a Piedmont, California oncologist, 
took the bait when he chatted with a Perverted Justice decoy online.30  
According to reports, Wolin first said he “couldn’t do anything”; 
however, the Perverted Justice decoy taunted Wolin and called him “just 
a chicken and a liar and a ditcher and a player.”31  Eventually, Wolin 
agreed to meet with the person whom he believed to be a minor.32  
However, when Wolin arrived to meet the “minor,” he was greeted by 
law enforcement and subsequently arrested.33  Wolin hired a celebrity 
attorney and has already raised the defense of entrapment.34  As of 
October 2, 2008, Dr. Wolin has yet to stand trial, and he continues to 
maintain that he was entrapped by the Perverted Justice decoy.35 
Apart from the entrapment defense, it is also clear Wolin and his 
attorney are fighting the organizational structure in place between the 
police, Dateline, and watchdog group Perverted Justice.36  During the 
preliminary hearing, the defense argued that the “Petaluma police [acted] 
as more puppet than master of an operation.”37  Wolin’s attorney, Blair 
Berk, also claimed that the Perverted Justice decoy was “paid” and 
“untrained” and that the decoy “badgered and cajoled him into 
committing a crime.”38  Clearly, Berk’s goal is to cast doubt on the legal 
viability of the alliance between the police, Dateline, and Perverted 
Justice. 
Wolin’s case is a rarity.  According to Wolin’s attorney: “Everybody 
pleads (guilty).  Everybody’s so humiliated by the rack and screw 
                                                          
 29. Linda Davis & John Simerman, Decision Due in Wolin Case, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2008. 
 30. Simerman, supra note 22, at A1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. John Simerman, Sting on “Dateline NBC” Show Called into Question, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A3. 
 35. See Linda Davis, Wolin’s Lawyer Files Discovery Motion, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2008.  (stating that Wolin’s attorney maintains that his client was “goaded” into meeting the 
Perverted Justice Decoy).  The trial date for Maurice Wolin is currently scheduled for February 6, 
2009.  Id. 
 36. See Simerman, supra note 22, at A1 (“Similar arguments are common in pedophile sting 
operations.  What’s different is that the show and its unusual arrangement among police, NBC and a 
controversial online vigilante group called Perverted Justice have largely escaped courtroom 
scrutiny.”). 
 37. John Simerman, Lawyer Questions Officials’ Role in TV Sex Sting, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2007, at A3. 
 38. Lori A. Carter, Wolin Wants Charge Tossed, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Jan. 11, 2008, 
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/EarlyEdition/article_view.cfm?recordID=8398&publishdate=01/11/
2008. 
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they’ve been put on . . . .”39  Berk further states, “I’m ashamed about 
how little these issues have been litigated.”40  The implications of this 
trial could change some of the tactics and practices of law enforcement, 
Dateline, and Perverted Justice.41 
Another much publicized “To Catch a Predator” sting led a county 
prosecutor, William Conradt Jr., to commit suicide when the SWAT 
team entered his house to arrest him over his online communications 
with a Perverted Justice decoy.42  Conradt’s untimely death led his sister 
Patricia to file suit against NBC Universal, claiming tort and civil rights 
violations against the network for its involvement with the online sting.43  
NBC brought a 12(b)(6) motion, and although “many of [Conradt’s] 
claims [were] dismissed,” the judge did allow “the principal claims to 
survive.”44  U.S. District Judge Denny Chin ruled: 
[A] reasonable jury could find that NBC crossed the line from 
responsible journalism to irresponsible and reckless intrusion into law 
enforcement.  Rather than merely report on law enforcement’s efforts 
to combat crime, NBC purportedly instigated and then placed itself 
squarely in the middle of a police operation, pushing the police to 
engage in tactics that were unnecessary and unwise, solely to generate 
more dramatic footage for a television show.45 
It is not surprising that a few months after Judge Chin’s ruling, NBC 
Universal settled its claims with Patricia Conradt and her deceased 
brother’s estate.46 
These situations show the potential problems inherent with the 
police’s association with cyber-vigilantes even if the vigilante groups do 
a public service.  Perverted Justice has organized stings in almost all U.S. 
jurisdictions and boasts a highly impressive conviction rate.47  When 
these cases do go to trial, entrapment is a commonly raised defense.48  
                                                          
 39. Simerman, supra note 22, at A1. 
 40. Id. at A1. 
 41. See John Simerman, Judge to Consider “Predator” Chat Logs, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2007, at A4 (“Wolin’s defense, if successful, could also provide a template for others to 
fight charges stemming from the controversial show.”). 
 42. See generally Dittrich, supra note 15. 
 43. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 44. Id. at 383. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See NBC Settles Suit over ‘Dateline: Predator’ Episode, CNN.com, June 26, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/06/26/dateline.predator.ap/index.html. 
 47. Perverted-Justice.com, supra note 27 (stating that Perverted Justice has conducted sting 
operations across the nation and the group’s “evidence was used to arrest 256 suspects during sting 
operations in 2006” alone, with a “100% conviction rate”). 
 48. Jarrod S. Hanson, Entrapment in Cyberspace: A Renewed Call for Reasonable Suspicion, 
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The law clearly does not allow use of this defense when a private party 
entraps another.49  This appears to disqualify the defense of entrapment 
when Perverted Justice is involved.  However, this Comment will show 
that in certain circumstances such a generalization is inaccurate. 
Although there may be debate over the relationship between 
Perverted Justice and law enforcement, this Comment will show what 
could occur should a court rule that cyber-vigilante groups are agents of 
the government during a coordinated online sting.  This Comment will 
show the need for cyber-vigilantes to abide by the same statutory and 
constitutional standards of investigative conduct that law enforcement 
follows.  The ultimate issue is whether it is worth the risk.  Especially 
when considering that a cyber-vigilante who fails to follow law 
enforcement standards of conduct could put convictions in jeopardy.  It is 
imperative that private groups such as Perverted Justice realize the legal 
risks associated with conducting online stings with law enforcement.  
Private groups that understand these risks will be more likely to use 
discretion in combating cyber-pedophilia. 
If an alliance is formed between police and cyber-vigilantes, there 
must be strict protocols.  The protocols must include training in the rules 
of evidence, and also training on how to avoid situations in which a 
defendant could argue entrapment.  Ultimately, each jurisdiction will 
have to address the accountability it expects from a cyber-vigilante.  
Whether it is through immediate supervision or some other means, law 
enforcement must be more of a player in how joint stings are conducted. 
The rest of the Comment analyzes scenarios where cyber-vigilantes 
reach the status of government agents as well as the consequences of 
such a classification.  To reach this end, Part II of this Comment outlines 
how Perverted Justice and law enforcement conduct cyber-stings.  Part II 
also explains the standards a court will likely follow to determine 
whether a cyber-vigilante is a state actor.  Finally, Part II addresses 
entrapment law and other constitutional implications a cyber-vigilante 
may face. 
Part III of the Comment then analyzes how a court will decide if a 
cyber-vigilante is a state actor.  Part III further addresses situations where 
a cyber-vigilante crosses the line, and the implications of doing so.  
Finally, this Comment analyzes why a ruling of state action will modify 
                                                                                                                       
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535, 536 (1996) (stating that because of “[t]he ease with which law 
enforcement officials can assume false identities in cyberspace . . . [d]efendants are . . . likely to 
invoke the entrapment defense with increasing frequency”). 
 49. See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (“There is no defense 
of private entrapment.”). 
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the way cyber-vigilantes conduct stings and coordinate with law 
enforcement.  Regardless of what the courts decide, cyber-vigilante 
groups must be ready to face the scrutiny of the courts to ensure 
successful conviction of cyber-predators. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. How Perverted Justice Operates 
Groups like Perverted Justice work exclusively with law 
enforcement as decoys to wage war against online predation of minors.50  
They do so by setting up sting operations, often with law enforcement’s 
approval.51  The basic function of a sting “is that through covert means, 
the authorities create or facilitate the very offense of which the defendant 
is convicted.  Normally this is done by having an undercover agent hold 
out some sort of bait, or opportunity to commit a crime, and then 
punishing the person who takes the bait.”52  Once an adult initiates 
sexually explicit dialogue, the trap is then laid to facilitate a meeting with 
the pedophile.53  The pedophile believes he will meet a minor, but 
instead is often apprehended by law enforcement.54 
The group’s website states: “We essentially strive to serve as a tool 
for [law enforcement] to use . . . and are trained exclusively on how to 
make solid, easily prosecutable cases that are guaranteed to put internet 
predators in jail—and we provide this service [to law enforcement] for 
free.”55  In order to establish a working relationship with law 
enforcement, the website states: 
[Law enforcement] emails us, we speak with them on the phone, and 
work out the details of jurisdiction and what they’d like to see out of 
the chat-logs we do.  Then, we make a note for the Contributors of 
where Information First contacts are, what areas they cover and how to 




                                                          
 50. Perverted-Justice.com, supra note 27. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387, 
388 (2005). 
 53. Id. at 390; see also Perverted-Justice.com Homepage, http://www.perverted-justice.com 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (highlighting the details of various sting operations). 
 54. Hay, supra note 52, at 388. 
 55. Perverted-Justice.com, supra note 27. 
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and turn over the information, first, to the already-stated interested and 
proactive police contact in that area.56 
Finally, Perverted Justice emphatically describes its association with 
law enforcement.  Perverted Justice proclaims, “What more can we say 
about how hand-in-hand we work with law enforcement across the 
nation?”57  It is this “hand-in-hand” relationship that helps strengthen the 
argument that Perverted Justice and similar cyber-vigilantes may be 
classified as government agents during the scope of the stings they 
coordinate with law enforcement.  It is also this “hand-in-hand” 
relationship that creates a need for cyber-vigilante groups to be well-
trained and aware of the potential pitfalls of violating the public trust. 
B.  How Law Enforcement Conducts a Cyber-Sting 
In J. Allan Cobb’s 2001 article, he sets out a hypothetical scenario of 
a law enforcement officer setting an online sting.58  Although fictional, 
the account gives good insight on the intricacies of the procedure and 
rules of evidence, and why it is so important for those working in law 
enforcement to be properly trained.  The story follows the fictional 
Sergeant Stan Sirius, “a veteran of many sting operations,” as he 
navigates through the world of online stings.59 
When Sergeant Sirius receives the assignment, he first asks for 
specialized training; his police chief says there is no time.60  However, 
according to a law enforcement contact, Chief Justice, setting a sting is 
easy and requires: “(1) [Creating] a username and member profile for a 
minor . . . [o]nline; (2) [A]n officer using the username of the minor goes 
in-and-out of ‘appropriate’ chat rooms; (3) [O]nce the sexual predator 
initiates contact with the minor, private conversations take place in chat 
rooms, ‘Private Rooms,’ or via ‘Instant Messages’ (IM’s).”61  Once the 
trap is set, it requires waiting until the “predator makes clear his intent to 
have sexual contact.”62  When this occurs, the decoy sets up a meeting 
                                                          
 56. Id. 
 57. Perverted-Justice.com, http://www.perverted-justice.com/index.php?pg=faq#cat6 (follow 
“Just HOW Cooperative is PeeJ with Police?” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 58. Cobb, supra note 6, at 805–21. 
 59. Id. at 807. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 807–08. 
 62. Id. at 808. 
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and an arrest can be made.63  According to Chief Justice, this process is 
“like shooting fish in a barrel.”64  It does not take much to realize that 
Chief Justice was being overly-simplistic in his assessment. 
Section III analyzes the importance for cyber-vigilantes to 
understand the intricacies of a sting, and why training must be required 
before a private party works with law enforcement. 
C. How a Private Party Can Become an Agent of the Government 
Any factual inquiry into whether a defendant’s constitutional rights 
were violated must first start with whether or not the cyber-vigilante 
sting constituted state action, as well as whether the private party was an 
agent of the government.65  If the courts rule that such a defined state 
relationship exists, then they could next determine whether a defendant’s 
rights were also violated.66 
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Ass’n, one of the more recent Fourteenth Amendment cases, the Supreme 
Court discussed the requirement of state action.67  The Court held that 
“state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private 
behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.’”68  This appears 
to open the door to a constitutional claim extending to groups like 
Perverted Justice.  The result is conceivable in instances in which a 
private party’s conduct is intertwined enough with the government so 
that courts could find state action.69 
The Court appears to admit that any inquiry into state action is 
complex,70 and that as a result the fact intensive inquiry “lack[s] rigid 
simplicity.”71  For each case, the Court denotes that there will be a full 
factual inquiry before determining state action, and that “no one fact can 
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state 
action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there 
may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 809. 
 65. United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 66. See id. at 346–47. 
 67. 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). 
 68. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 
 69. See id. at 302. 
 70. See id. at 295 (stating that the Court’s cases “try to plot a line between state action subject 
to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not”). 
 71. Id. 
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government.”72  This is the issue that occurs with cyber-vigilante cases.  
There is no one set of facts to look at in determining whether groups like 
Perverted Justice meet the definition of state actor.  Each case must be 
viewed separately.  The Court does provide guidance by showing 
specific instances in which the Court found state action.73  The Court 
states: 
We have, for example, held that a challenged activity may be state 
action when it results from the State’s exercise of “coercive power,” 
when the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or 
covert,” or when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in 
joint activity with the State or its agents.”  We have treated a nominally 
private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by an “agency of the 
State,” when it has been delegated a public function by the State, when 
it is “entwined with governmental policies,” or when government is 
“entwined in [its] management or control.”74 
Obviously each instance is different.  However, these numerous 
examples illustrate the strong need for cyber-vigilantes to be educated as 
to their potential status as state actors.  This helps ensure that they follow 
legal means during a sting. 
D. What Constitutes Entrapment 
As the case of Dr. Wolin illustrates,75 a suspected pedophile caught 
in an online sting will almost always raise the entrapment defense.76  The 
issue is whether it will be successful against a private party who, 
although working for law enforcement, ultimately conducted the sting.  
Perverted Justice answers the question of whether its actions constitute 
entrapment by stating: “No.  Not on any level. . . . Entrapment is a 
situation where you go out of your way to entice a citizen as law 
enforcement to commit a crime they otherwise would not commit.”77 
 
 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 295–96. 
 73. See id. at 296 (“Our cases have identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of 
such an attribution [to the state].”). 
 74. Id. (citations omitted). 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 29–41. 
 76. See Hanson, supra note 48, at 535–36 (stating that “[d]efendants are . . . likely to invoke the 
entrapment defense with increasing frequency” due to the “potential for overzealous law 
enforcement in cyberspace”). 
 77. Perverted-Justice.com, http://www.perverted-justice.com/index.php?pg=faq (follow “Is it 
entrapment? A.+” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (emphasis added). 
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Entrapment has been a cornerstone defense for criminals when an 
arrest has been the result of a government coordinated sting.78  The issue 
of private groups conducting online stings is relatively new; however, 
there are many similar situations where private citizens have worked 
hand in hand with the government.79  It is important to analogize cases 
where entrapment has been successful with the more unique situation 
where cyber-vigilantes work with the government to catch sex-predators. 
An entrapment defense consists of two elements: first, “government 
inducement of the crime,” and second, “lack of predisposition on the part 
of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.”80  Further, 
entrapment is defined as “[a] law-enforcement officer’s or government 
agent’s inducement of a person to commit a crime, by means of fraud or 
undue persuasion, in an attempt to later bring a criminal prosecution 
against that person.”81  In referring to the entrapment defense, the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Davis ruled that “[i]nducement must be 
provided by someone acting for the government.”82  However, it also 
stated that “the government cannot make use of an informer and then 
claim disassociation.”83  The court concluded that if “the informant was 
clearly acting on behalf of the government before inducing a defendant, 
the informant is an agent of the government.”84  It is crucial to 
understand that the government inducement prong only becomes 
applicable to cyber-vigilantes should they first be classified as 
government agents.  The case above suggests that it is entirely plausible 
to find a private party “acting for the government” for purposes of the 
entrapment defense. 
Although the stings at the heart of this paper do not involve hacking 
into another’s computer, the most analogous case in determining whether 
an agency relationship is formed between groups like Perverted Justice 
and law enforcement is United States v. Jarrett.85  In Jarrett, the court 
                                                          
 78. See Hanson, supra note 48, at 536 (“The ease with which law enforcement officials can 
assume false identities in cyberspace and the suitability of cyberspace for consensual or victimless 
crimes indicate a probable increase in undercover sting operations.  Defendants are therefore likely 
to invoke the entrapment defense with increasing frequency.”). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003) (determining whether a 
computer hacker was acting as government agent when he searched the defendant’s computer for 
pornography). 
 80. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). 
 81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004). 
 82. 36 F.3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 83. Id. at 1430 n.2 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958)). 
 84. Id. (citing Sherman, 356 U.S. at 345; United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 806–07 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 85. 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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was faced with the issue of whether a computer hacker was acting as a 
government agent when he searched Jarrett’s computer for child 
pornography.86  If the hacker was a government agent at the time of the 
search, it would have been in violation of Jarrett’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.87  Although the court and the parties both conceded that an agency 
relationship existed, the timing of the formation was crucial to 
determining the outcome.88  The court stated that “[b]ecause the 
Government did not know of, or in any way participate in, the hacker’s 
search of Jarrett’s computer at the time of the search, the hacker did not 
act as a Government agent.”89 
The facts of the case are not controverted.90  The computer hacker, 
referred to as Unknownuser, acting on his own initiative hacked the 
computer of an alleged child pornographer, Dr. Bradley Steiger.91  
Unknownuser found evidence of child pornography and anonymously 
sent the information to the FBI and local law enforcement.92  Steiger 
attempted to appeal his conviction on the grounds that Unknownuser was 
a government agent; however, the Eleventh Circuit “reason[ed] that 
Unknownuser acquired all of the relevant information about Steiger 
before he contacted law enforcement, and thus was, at all material times, 
acting as a private individual.”93  After the fact, the agent in charge of the 
Steiger case e-mailed and telephoned Unknownuser in order to gauge his 
interest in testifying and further helping law enforcement.94  The agent, 
James Duffy, stated in an e-mail to Unknownuser, “If you want to bring 
other information forward, I am available.”95 
It was not until five months later that Agent Duffy again tried 
contacting Unknownuser to see if he would be interested in appearing as 
a witness in the Steiger trial.96  Unknownuser responded in the 
negative.97  Then the agent received an unsolicited e-mail from 
Unknownuser stating that he had “found another child molester.”98  The 
                                                          
 86. See id. at 340. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 346 (noting that Jarrett’s computer was hacked by Unknownuser before 
government contact or involvement). 
 89. Id. at 340–41. 
 90. Id. at 341. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 341 n.1 (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 94. Id. at 341. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 342. 
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reference to “another child molester” was the defendant, William 
Jarrett.99  Upon receipt of the incriminating evidence, the government 
applied for and received a search warrant.100  The search and subsequent 
arrest took place on December 13, 2001.101  Shortly thereafter, Agent 
Margaret Faulkner contacted Unknownuser and, according to the court, 
“engaged in what can only be characterized as the proverbial ‘wink and a 
nod.’”102  The exact e-mail is as follows: 
I can not [sic] ask you to search out cases such as the ones you have 
sent to us.  That would make you an agent of the Federal Government 
and make how you obtain your information illegal and we could not 
use it against the men in the pictures you send.  But if you should 
happen across such pictures as the ones you have sent to us and wish us 
to look into the matter, please feel free to send them to us . . . .  But as 
long as you are not “hacking” at our request, we can take the pictures 
and identify the men and take them to court.103 
In further response, the hacker “suggested in no uncertain terms that 
he would continue to search for child pornographers using the same 
methods employed to identify Steiger and Jarrett.”104  As a result of the 
e-mail chain, the district court ruled that, “the Government and 
Unknownuser had ‘expressed their consent to an agency relationship,’ 
thereby rendering any evidence obtained . . . inadmissible.”105  The 
Government appealed the suppression ruling.106 
The appellate court was faced with the task of determining whether 
Unknownuser was acting as a private individual or a government 
agent.107  If Unknownuser was a government agent, then surely Jarrett’s 
Fourth Amendment protections were violated.108  The Fourth Circuit 
stated that “[d]etermining whether the requisite agency relationship 
exists ‘necessarily turns on the degree of the Government’s participation 
in the private party’s activities, . . . a question that can only be resolved 
“in light of all the circumstances.”’”109  The court further reasoned that 
“[i]n order to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment . . . the Government 
                                                          
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 343. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 344. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)). 
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must do more than passively accept or acquiesce in a private party’s 
search efforts, [but] [r]ather, there must be some degree of Government 
participation in the private search.”110 
The standard set by the court is as follows: “(1) whether the 
Government knew of and acquiesced in the private search; and (2) 
whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement or had 
some other independent motivation.”111  Part III addresses how this 
standard can be modified in order to determine whether groups like 
Perverted Justice are in fact government agents. 
United States v. Gamache is another case that illustrates how a 
defendant may successfully raise the entrapment defense.112  Local law 
enforcement conducted the sting operation that caught the defendant; 
however, because of the “traveling in interstate commerce” implications, 
the case was tried in federal court.113  The First Circuit looked at the 
issues and determined that the defendant met the burdens required to 
receive an entrapment instruction.114  As a result, the conviction was 
thrown out and a new trial set.115 
The facts in Gamache are relatively straightforward.  The sting 
began in 1995 when law enforcement in New Hampshire placed a 
classified ad in a swingers-magazine which stated, “female, 31; Single 
mom, two girls, one boy, seeks male as partner and mentor, seeks fun, 
enjoys travel and photography.”116  Law enforcement knowingly used the 
word “mentor” in the hopes that it would “draw out only persons who 
were interested in ‘inter-generational sexual interaction between adults 
and children.’”117  Gamache responded to the advertisement, but believed 
mentor meant the woman was just “looking for somebody to take care of 
her kids like they do nowadays . . . [f]inancially, take them fishing, 
hunting, whatever.”118  The correspondence continued and each time the 
government piqued the defendant’s curiosity more, until the defendant 
committed the crime.119  The court concluded that the Government 
initiated contact with Gamache and also continued sending 
correspondence, even when “it became apparent, from the initial letters, 
                                                          
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 113. Id. at 8. 
 114. Id. at 12. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 3. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 3–7. 
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that appellant was on a different wavelength than the detective.”120  The 
court reasoned that it was through the government’s persistence that 
“[a]ppellant ultimately became ensnared by the detective’s artifice.”121  
The court ultimately concluded “that it was the Government’s insistence 
and artful manipulation of appellant that finally drew him into the web 
skillfully spun by the detective.”122 
E. Constitutional Implications 
The state action doctrine comes from the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition, “[n]o 
State shall.”123  The “general principle” is easily stated: constitutional 
rights “operate only against the government.”124  This Comment analyzes 
several possible scenarios where a defendant caught in a cyber-sex sting 
could assert constitutional claims. 
First, the Fourth Amendment gives private citizens the right to be 
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”125  Part III analyzes a hypothetical 
instance in which a cyber-predator’s Fourth Amendment rights are 
violated by a cyber-vigilante.  Second, the Fifth Amendment states that 
no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”126  As discussed later in Part III, this Comment 
purposefully does not address in detail the relevant implications of the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, nor the Miranda v. Arizona 127 
problems that undoubtedly exist.  A mention of the Fifth Amendment, 
however, is included to reiterate the potential pitfalls that await a cyber- 
 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 10. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, 
Federalism and Congress, 59 MO. L. REV. 499, 500 (1994).  Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 124. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1229 (1999). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 127. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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vigilante who fails to follow law enforcement protocols, including all 
relevant constitutional standards of conduct. 
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability goes beyond the 
initial prohibition against certain state action.128  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause states, “nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”129  As Part III analyzes, this becomes almost the catch-all 
provision that a defendant will likely use if they do assert a constitutional 
violation. 
If a court first finds that there was a constitutional violation, the 
defendant could seek redress through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The applicable 
portion of § 1983 states: 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .130 
As with entrapment, these claims are only applicable when the 
defendant was a representative acting on behalf of the state.131  The 
Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. held that “conduct 
satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law.”132 
Ultimately, a defendant has several options should a cyber-vigilante 
group cross the line during an online sting.  However, the first question 
will always be whether or not the cyber-vigilante is an agent of the 
government. 
                                                          
 128. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating the prohibition, “[n]o State shall”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 131. See 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights § 369 (2006) (“[T]he wrongdoer must actually represent the 
State whereby his or her act is the act of the State.” (quoting Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 
803, 805 (D. Colo. 1969))). 
 132. 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Possibility of a Cyber-Vigilante Reaching Government Agent 
Status 
The advent of cybercrime, specifically cyber-pedophilia, has 
increased governmental attention to a national problem.133  Concurrently, 
the trend of private groups joining the war against cyber-pedophiles 
appears to be an “unavoidable reality.”134  When private groups work 
anonymously and outside the knowledge of law enforcement, it is easy to 
conclude that their conduct “is generally not encompassed by the 
constitutional and statutory restrictions that apply to law enforcement 
investigations.”135  The difference arises when law enforcement is aware 
of the private-party’s conduct and subsequently creates a strong 
connection to the actions of the private party.  Recruitment by law 
enforcement and use of resources to investigate crime are just a few 
things that would justify a leap from the realm of private action to that of 
a government agent.136  Brenner and Clarke suggest that this 
collaboration offers headaches in the legal world of public-private 
investigative activities.137  They state: “Our law assumes public efforts or 
private efforts; it is not calibrated to deal with public-private efforts. . . . 
[T]he statutory and constitutional standards that govern law enforcement 
do not apply to civilians unless, and until, law enforcement officers 
recruit a civilian to participate in reacting to a crime.”138 
A valid defense against a cyber-vigilante first requires a 
determination of the group’s association to law enforcement.  Anthony 
Dillof argues in his article, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, that 
privately and publicly entrapped pedophiles have the same mindset in 
regards to their belief that the person they communicated with on the 
Internet was in fact a minor.139  Even so, the only time a valid defense or 
constitutional challenge may be raised is if the private party’s status 
reaches that of a government agent.140  As the court in United States v. 
                                                          
 133. See FBI, supra note 1 (Between 1996 and 2006, opened cases rose from 113 to 2135). 
 134. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 8, at 674. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 675. 
 137. Id. at 685. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 
846 (2004). 
 140. See id. (“Governmentally and privately entrapped individuals share the same subjective 
beliefs about the circumstances surrounding their illegal conduct, and therefore, all things equal, are 
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Barnett held, “‘[e]ntrapment as a defense occurs only when criminal 
conduct is the product of the creative activity of government officials or 
those private citizens acting under government direction.’”141  It is when 
cyber-vigilantes like Perverted Justice coordinate with law enforcement 
and provide their expertise and cooperation that they arguably become 
agents of the government.  If cyber-vigilantes are agents of the 
government, then they must be trained in the rules and procedures of law 
enforcement.  Otherwise, convictions will be put at risk. 
To illustrate how a private party may become an agent of the 
government, one author writing on instances of “private entrapment” 
analogized using the Biblical story of Job to show the interconnectedness 
of the principal (God) and his agent (Satan) in tempting Job.142  He 
stated: 
Only in Job has the one seeking to induce the wrong been 
commissioned by the one who would punish it.  Similarly, in our 
temporal justice system, only when the one inducing or prompting the 
crime is working as an agent of the state does entrapment even enter 
into the picture.143 
If Perverted Justice or another cyber-vigilante group works alone and 
conducts stings through its own initiative, then there does not appear to 
be a problem.  However, if that same cyber-vigilante works intimately 
with law enforcement, the court could find the group was acting as a 
government agent.  Ultimately, under theories of entrapment law, if the 
cyber-vigilante is acting as a private party, then there is no entrapment; 
conversely, if the courts find cyber-vigilantes are government agents, 
then an entrapment defense may lead to an acquittal.144 
Each case is extremely unique and each sting a cyber-vigilante 
conducts provides the facts a judge will look at as the basis for the 
ruling.145  Therefore, it is altogether likely that in some instances a court 
will find a cyber-vigilante group’s connection with law enforcement is so 
interrelated that state action exists, while in other circumstances it does 
not reach that level.  It is these uncertainties that must alert cyber-
vigilantes to the potential risks of their operation. 
                                                                                                                       
equally culpable.  Yet private entrapment is no defense.”). 
 141. 197 F.3d 138, 143 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Dodson, 481 F.2d 656, 657 (5th 
Cir. 1972)). 
 142. Andrew Carlon, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REV. 1081, 
1083 (2007). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Dillof, supra note 139, at 842. 
 145. United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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Cyber-vigilantes must use effective methods of investigation that 
mirror law enforcement standards.  If these groups do not act according 
to law enforcement methods, they are putting into jeopardy the 
successful conviction of their targets.  Private groups working with law 
enforcement must be prepared to face the court’s ruling regardless of the 
outcome. 
The risks associated with lack of training include a predator escaping 
conviction and an assured conviction forfeited.  It is clear that cyber-
vigilante groups and law enforcement must work toward a common 
purpose, and that any action the parties take must be on sound legal 
footing.  Ultimately, it is this private versus public inquiry that is at the 
heart of this paper. 
B. Entrapment Law—How Analogous Cases Shed Light on the 
Private/Public Inquiry 
In United States v. Jarrett, the court set forth a standard that helps 
future cases analyze the public versus private dilemma.146  As described 
in Part II, Jarrett involved a private citizen who hacked into computers 
in order to catch persons possessing child pornography.147  The standard 
set forth in Jarrett, which is applicable to cyber-predator stings as well, 
looks to: “(1) whether the Government knew of and acquiesced in the 
private search; and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist 
law enforcement or had some other independent motivation.”148  A 
modified standard applicable to cyber-vigilantes and sex-predator stings 
would require the court to determine: (1) whether the Government knew 
of and allowed a cyber-vigilante group to conduct a sting operation, and 
(2) whether the group was motivated to help law enforcement convict 
potential child-predators. 
For the first factor, “‘[k]nowledge and acquiescence . . . encompass 
the requirement that the government must also affirmatively encourage, 
initiate or instigate the private action.’”149  In the cases with Perverted 
Justice, it is often local law enforcement that initiates the dialogue.150  
                                                          
 146. Id. at 344. 
 147. Id. at 340–41. 
 148. Id. at 344. 
 149. Id. at 345 (quoting United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 150. See Perverted-Justice.com, http://www.perverted-justice.com/index.php?pg=faq#cat1 (fol-
low “What is your policy on working with law enforcement” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 26, 2008) 
(“If a law enforcement department, detective or agency wants the ‘Information First,’ they email us, 
we speak with them on the phone, and work out the details of jurisdiction and what they’d like to see 
out of the chat-logs we do.”). 
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Also, “[i]t is only by the exercise of some form of control that the actions 
of one may be attributed to another.  Mere knowledge of another’s 
independent action does not produce vicarious responsibility absent some 
manifestation of consent and the ability to control.”151  So the dialogue 
on the part of law enforcement must not be mere passive support for the 
sting, but something more.152  The easy case is when Perverted Justice 
decoys are deputized by local law enforcement.  It would appear obvious 
that Perverted Justice would be a state actor for both constitutional 
purposes and entrapment purposes.  Although Perverted Justice has been 
deputized for some sting operations,153 the exact number of times is 
unknown.  As a result, the court must employ a case-by-case analysis 
since no generalized determination could be confidently made. 
The argument that groups like Perverted Justice will make is that law 
enforcement does not assert control over their actions.  In Jarrett, the 
government conceded that the e-mail exchange with Unknownuser likely 
created an agency relationship.154  The only reason this was not 
determinative in Jarrett, however, was because the Government’s 
acquiescence came after Jarrett’s computer had already been hacked.155  
It is clear that control is important; however, it was the time of control 
and acquiescence that determined the outcome of the case.156  The Fourth 
Circuit ruled that “[s]uch after-the-fact conduct cannot serve to transform 
the prior relationship between [a private party] and the Government into 
an agency relationship with respect to the search of [defendant]’s 
computer.”157  In the end, the courts must look to the unique facts of each 
case to determine what type of relationship was formed, and if a private 
sting in fact becomes a government operation.158 
The Fourth Circuit also analyzed the agency relationship as well as 
the importance of looking at the government’s intent when it held: 
 
                                                          
 151. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345 (citing United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 152. Id. at 346 (“[T]here must be some evidence of Government participation in or affirmative 
encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional.  Passive acceptance 
by the Government is not enough.”). 
 153. McCollum, supra note 16, at 31. 
 154. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 346. 
 155. Id.; see also id. at 347 (stating that although “no such relationship existed” with the 
government at the time of the computer-hacking, it is probable that the “Faulkner e-mails” would 
have been sufficient to form an agency relationship had they come before). 
 156. Id. at 346. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. at 345 (“[C]ourts should look to the facts and circumstances of each case in 
determining when a private search is in fact a Government search.”). 
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[I]n order to bring [a private party] within the grasp of an agency 
relationship, [the defendant] would have to show that the Government 
made more explicit representations and assurances . . . that it was 
interested in furthering its relationship with [the private party] and 
availing itself of the fruits of any information that [the private party] 
obtained.159 
A similar argument can be made between law enforcement’s dealings 
with groups like Perverted Justice.  In the Wolin case, the Petaluma 
police captain stated that the department planned to conduct its own 
sting, but “sought Perverted Justice for technical assistance.”160  Also, in 
the events that led up to the Conradt sting and his untimely death, it was 
Perverted Justice that reached out to law enforcement.161  Perverted 
Justice previously assisted the Murphy, Texas Police Department with a 
small sting; however, soon after, Perverted Justice raised the stakes and 
offered to have a full scale Dateline program on its Murphy stings.162  
According to one source, the Murphy Chief of Police “didn’t hesitate” 
and hoped that the Dateline sting operations would “put Murphy on the 
map.”163  Ironically, it did “put Murphy on the map,” but not in the way 
Chief Myrick likely envisioned.164 
The statements above reflect law enforcements’ willingness to 
coordinate with Perverted Justice and reap the benefits of a sting.  That 
willingness goes directly to the intent of law enforcement, which was so 
critical in the Jarrett case.165  Although each case offers unique facts and 
circumstances, it is entirely possible that cyber-vigilante groups like 
Perverted Justice are state actors during the limited scope of the sting.  
The two examples above show more than just “passive acquiescence,” 
which arguably puts the burden on the government to show that it was 
not in collusion with the cyber-vigilante group.  This result propels the 
private party into state actor territory and allows a defendant to put into 
question the constitutional validity of the sting. 
                                                          
 159. Id. at 347. 
 160. Simerman, supra note 22, at A1. 
 161. Dittrich, supra note 15, at 238. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 238–39. 
 164. In the aftermath of Conradt’s suicide, the police, Dateline, and Perverted Justice received 
their share of negative publicity when the local district attorney refused to prosecute any of the 
twenty-three men originally arrested in the Murphy sting.  See id. at 243. 
 165. United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Jarrett would have to show that 
the Government made more explicit representations and assurances . . . that it was interested in 
furthering its relationship [with the sting].”). 
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C. When a Sting Goes Too Far—The Affirmative Defense of Entrapment 
When a cyber-vigilante works with law enforcement, the rules 
undoubtedly change.  If a cyber-vigilante’s true goal is to put predators 
behind bars, then there should be enough of an incentive to comport with 
law enforcement standards.  “This is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’”166  
Wolin’s attorney made this simple argument to the judge during his 
preliminary hearing, and maintained that such stings are to be used to 
catch actual sex predators and not to seduce an innocent person into 
breaking the law.167  There is an obvious potential for untrained cyber-
vigilantes to carry a sting too far.  As a result, it is not surprising that the 
few defendants who have gone to trial raise entrapment as an affirmative 
defense.168 
The seminal case of entrapment law is Sorrells v. United States.169  
The Court stated that law enforcement may use “[a]rtifice and stratagem” 
in order to “catch those engaged in criminal enterprise.”170  The 
difference between what constitutes entrapment and what does not often 
turns on the motivation of the government.171  The issue is whether law 
enforcement officials are trying to induce an otherwise innocent person 
to commit an offense merely so the government may prosecute.172  The 
Supreme Court in Sorrells adhered to the general principle of Butts v. 
United States173 where the Court held: 
 The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to 
punish crime.  It is not their duty to incite to and create crime for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it.  Here the evidence 
strongly tends to prove, if it does not conclusively do so, that their first 
and chief endeavor was to cause, to create, crime . . . .174 
It is the very nature of a sting which creates the “potential for 
overzealous law enforcement” to go too far.175  It is not hard to imagine a 
scenario in which a person operating a sting gets frustrated when a 
                                                          
 166. John Simerman, Doctor Will Go to Trial Based on TV Sting, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 
19, 2007, at A3. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Simerman, supra note 22, at A1. 
 169. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 170. Id. at 441 (citing Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895)). 
 171. Id. at 442. 
 172. Id. 
 173. 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). 
 174. Id. at 38. 
 175. Hanson, supra note 48, at 535. 
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suspected predator does not take the bait.  Out of frustration, a cyber-
vigilante could cross the line in trying to induce the crime.  Obviously, 
this puts convictions in jeopardy and is precisely what occurred in the 
highly publicized case of Jacobson v. United States.176  In Jacobson, the 
petitioner was convicted of “violating a provision of the Child Protection 
Act of 1984” for knowingly receiving child pornography.177  Over the 
course of twenty-six months, the government tried various methods to 
entice Jacobson to order child pornography.178  Finally, Jacobson ordered 
a catalog depicting child pornography.179  When asked about the catalog 
he stated that “the Government had succeeded in piquing his 
curiosity.”180  Jacobson argued entrapment, but his defense failed and he 
was convicted.181  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction on the 
ground that the second element of entrapment was not met, namely that 
Jacobson was “predisposed to break the law and hence was not 
entrapped.”182  Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the 
government “overstepped the line between setting a trap for the ‘unwary 
innocent’ and the ‘unwary criminal.’”183 
The Court’s inquiry in Jacobson focused not only on the petitioner’s 
predisposition to commit the crime (there is no dispute he committed a 
crime), but also whether the government went too far in its 
inducement.184  The Court reasoned that the government’s zeal cannot 
“implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a 
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the 
Government may prosecute.”185  The Attorney General’s Guidelines on 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations instruct that 
“[e]ntrapment must be scrupulously avoided.”186  Federal officials 
receive training on how to “ensure, insofar as it is possible, that 
entrapment issues do not adversely affect criminal prosecutions.”187   
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These same techniques must be followed by cyber-vigilantes working 
with law enforcement in order to avoid similar adverse impacts. 
According to Jacobson, the reason to apply such a stringent standard 
is to avoid circumstances where “the Government’s quest for convictions 
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left 
to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.”188  In 
such a circumstance, the courts have the discretion to intervene and allow 
an entrapment instruction to be offered to the jury for consideration.189 
In Part II of this Comment, the case of United States v. Gamache 
illustrated a scenario in which law enforcement went too far, allowing 
the alleged predator to mount a successful entrapment defense.190  To 
bolster Gamache’s argument, “the detective testified that appellant did 
not even fit a pedophile profile and that there was no evidence that linked 
him to prior sexual activities with children.”191  Ultimately, it was the 
government that initiated everything:192 
It was the Government that first mentioned the “children” as sex 
objects; it was the Government that first used sexually explicit 
language involving the “children”; it was the Government that 
escalated the subject of sex with children; and it was the Government 
that first brought up the use of photographic equipment.193 
Because the Government was the aggressor and initiator, the Court stated 
that “the evidence raises a reasonable doubt that the Government 
improperly induced a citizen to commit crimes that he was not 
predisposed to commit, yet crimes for which he was charged and 
convicted.”194 
This is where the problem lies.  In a noble effort to secure 
convictions, law enforcement at times crosses the line.  If law 
enforcement has a propensity to be over-eager, how much more do 
cyber-vigilantes?  If cyber-vigilantes do not understand that they are 
required to follow the protocols of government, then they may 
potentially initiate and continue dialogue that crosses the line.195  
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Unfortunately, the consequence is that a defendant may raise an 
entrapment defense and thus possibly escape conviction.  This 
Comment’s purpose is to clarify any potential misconceptions about the 
agency relationship with government so that cyber-vigilantes may be 
better prepared to meet court scrutiny.  It is possible that a court could 
rule that a cyber-vigilante was not a government agent at the time of a 
sting.  However, it is in society’s interest to have cyber-vigilantes acting 
according to government protocols, because the ultimate goal is to 
protect the innocent while prosecuting only those who are guilty. 
Therefore, cyber-vigilantes should receive training that is at least on 
par with law enforcement training.  The reason is simple.  Training will 
reduce the likelihood of successful defenses against prosecution.  Donald 
S. Yamagami argues that: “[t]raining the FBI to execute successful sting 
operations . . . will reduce the likelihood that successful defenses will 
prevail in court.”196  Thus, law enforcement should never turn over a 
sting operation to a private party without first providing the private party 
with the legal means to accomplish it. 
According to Yamagami, the fact that the internet transcends 
physical geographical boundaries “makes it especially difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to monitor and to apprehend Internet criminals 
because they cover areas of conflicting police jurisdictions.”197  Cyber-
vigilantes have done a public service inside the Internet domain.  Often 
local law enforcement does not have the means to conduct stings, and 
vigilantes wanting to work with government can help, but there needs to 
be better training and more accountability when doing so. 
To illustrate the danger of losing a case to entrapment, Yamagami 
analyzes a Ninth Circuit case holding that the defendant was 
entrapped.198  The court ruled that “[t]he agents, in overstepping their 
bounds, offered the recently divorced transvestite via e-mails the 
possibility of family if he agreed to teach three girls how to have sex.”199  
The opinion concluded, “[t]here is surely enough real crime in our 
society that it is unnecessary for our law enforcement officials to spend 
months luring an obviously lonely and confused individual to cross the 
line between fantasy and criminality.”200  Cyber-vigilantes must realize 
that if they cross the line, all the good they do can be compromised. 
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It can certainly be argued that entrapment is not that successful of a 
defense; so why does it matter?  In Yamagami’s article, he states: “Even 
though entrapment has not been found in many of these cases, many 
judges are wary of undercover agents acting as young girls and 
encouraging otherwise innocent people to commit crimes.”201  
Yamagami quoted a Maryland public defender who stated: “Agents are 
likely to encourage, or at least continue a conversation that turns sexual 
when an actual child likely would end it.”202  Yamagami further opines 
that “[a]lthough FBI agents have always had to pass the rigorous FBI 
academy and go through specialized training on investigations of 
computer-related child exploitation crimes, the training must be more 
legally focused.”203  If the FBI recognizes the need for specialized 
training, it would be naïve and presumptuous to suggest that private 
groups are better equipped to handle the intricacies of the law without 
such focused and intense training.  Even though entrapment may not be 
successful, the potential for over-zealousness needs to be reined in to 
assure a legal sting occurs.  Effective training is the key to reach that end. 
D. How Constitutional Implications Could Affect the Cyber-
Vigilante/Law Enforcement Relationship 
Entrapment is historically only a statutory or common law 
defense.204  However, imagine a scenario in which a defendant 
challenges a sting based on a claim that his constitutional rights were 
violated.  As with entrapment, the courts would need to address whether 
the private party’s participation was state action.205  If a court determines 
that there is state action, then the court can address the question of 
whether a constitutional violation occurred. 
In Alan Madry’s article on private party accountability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he states that “[i]f a state sufficiently ‘involves’ 
itself in private conduct, then the private conduct is itself state action, the 
private party a state actor, and the conduct is subject to the standards of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”206  As a result, the state action doctrine is 
generally inapplicable to excluding evidence uncovered by private 
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individuals, even if the private individual used means that would 
otherwise have resulted in a constitutional violation.207  David Sklansky 
argues in his article regarding private police work that “[p]rivate policing 
poses challenges for the state action doctrine because it straddles the 
divide between ordinary private citizens—a concerned neighbor or 
vigilant storekeeper—and uniformed police officers.”208 
In determining the existence of state action, the easy case would be if 
the private party was deputized by law enforcement before carrying out 
investigative functions.209  In one instance where Perverted Justice was 
deputized, it appears that it was local law enforcement that suggested 
it.210  This underlines the importance of control and entwinement, 
theories present in the Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Ass’n211 case discussed in Part II of this Comment.  If 
similar cyber-vigilantes comply with law enforcement’s request to 
deputize, they must know that they are without question acting as law 
enforcement, and therefore, the state action doctrine is applicable to their 
conduct.  Any violation during their investigative duties would result in a 
potential loss of conviction or the defendant invoking other constitutional 
means of redress.212  This alone is sufficient to alert cyber-vigilantes of a 
need to follow strict law enforcement guidelines, specifically while 
conducting an online sting with the government’s approval. 
A deputized cyber-vigilante is the easy case.  However, what about 
cases in which the vigilante is not deputized?  What level of connection 
to law enforcement must be evident for the constitutional restrictions to 
extend to their behavior?  This scenario is obviously more common, and 
thus, the unique facts of each case require a more in-depth analysis on 
the part of the court. 
David Sklansky analyzes Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.213 to 
determine what constitutes state action.214  In Lugar, the court states: 
[T]he party charged with the [constitutional] deprivation must be a 
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.  This may be because 
he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained  
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significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise 
chargeable to the State.215 
Sklansky then looks to a more current case that describes the above 
elements as fact-intensive.216  In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the 
court states: 
[O]ur precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular 
action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant 
to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on 
governmental assistance and benefits, whether the actor is performing a 
traditional governmental function, and whether the injury caused is 
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental 
authority.217 
A court would obviously be required to look at each of these elements 
and determine the likelihood that state action occurred.  The first element 
would require a fact-specific study in order to determine the level of 
reliance a cyber-vigilante had on law enforcement.  The second element 
seems obvious as a cyber-vigilante is clearly performing a traditional 
government function that is typically reserved to law enforcement.  As 
compared to the entrapment analysis earlier in this Comment, it is 
evident that the burden on a defendant to prove state action is quite 
heavy.  Nonetheless, logic dictates that training would lessen the chance 
that a defendant could successfully raise a constitutional challenge. 
1. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Possibilities 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and grants privacy considerations to each person, his or her 
house, papers, and effects.218  Perverted Justice uses a decoy to chat 
online with a predator; if a call is placed, Perverted Justice relies on 
public phone directories to find out the identity of the perpetrator.219  
There is no apparent violation for using such publicly accessible 
information, and therefore, construed under this light, there would likely 
be no search.  The author can only hypothesize of an unlikely scenario 
where a cyber-vigilante posing as law enforcement coerces a private 
company to disclose the identity of a computer user.  It would be this 
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scenario that could offer a defendant the right to succeed on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, assuming that a court first finds the private party’s 
conduct to be state action. 
The facts necessary to support a Fourth Amendment claim are not 
likely present in most online sting operations; however, the Court’s 
ruling in Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc.220 shows that it can happen.  
Dateline was allegedly heavily involved in the decision to secure a 
warrant and to use a SWAT team.221  As a result, Judge Chin denied 
NBC’s motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim and stated that “a 
reasonable jury could find that the intrusion on Conradt’s privacy 
substantially outweighed the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”222  Obviously the Conradt case is unique because Dateline’s 
alleged misconduct did not come directly out of the online sting, but 
through the enforcement and legitimacy of the warrant.  However, the 
fact that a private party’s conduct could potentially lead to a successful 
Fourth Amendment claim must put cyber-vigilantes on notice. 
This Comment will also not spend time looking into the Fifth 
Amendment as a source for possible constitutional violations.  The scope 
of this paper is narrow, and includes only half of the debate as to issues 
surrounding Dateline’s “To Catch a Predator.”  Another paper could be 
written which looks at the interaction of the media in relation to the 
alleged predators.  Such a paper might focus on whether Dateline’s 
affiliation with Perverted Justice, who in turn works with law 
enforcement, constitutes some type of state action on the part of the 
media.223 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process Implications and State 
Action 
If a defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated by a 
cyber-vigilante coordinated sting, the most likely avenue for a claim is 
the Due Process Clause.  However, even a Due Process claim will be 
extremely hard to prove.  In an article on sting operation procedures and 
the potential entrapment defense, Bruce Hay suggests: “Sometimes a 
defendant may establish that the government’s conduct was so 
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outrageous that it violated the federal Due Process Clause, but this is 
exceedingly unusual.  Virtually all entrapment cases are based on 
common law or (in the case of some states) on statutes.”224  Kansas case 
law suggests that if a court does not find outrageous conduct, and thus no 
Fourteenth Amendment violation, then entrapment is always a fall-
back.225  This implies that the outrageous conduct standard for a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation is a heavy burden for a defendant to 
prove. 
The Kansas Supreme Court requires four elements to prove 
outrageous government conduct: “the type of criminal activity involved, 
whether the activity is preexisting or instead ‘instigated’ by the 
government, whether the government is directing the activity or merely 
participating in it, and the causal link between the government’s conduct 
and the acts of the defendant.”226  A court must look to the facts of the 
case and individually determine whether the “outrageous conduct” 
elements were met.  Because of the fact-intensive nature of this 
constitutional challenge, it would be difficult to show how often this sort 
of claim would be successful.  However, one court stated: “In order to 
constitute a due process violation, the government’s conduct must be so 
outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court.”227  If state action 
were to be found, it is possible that a complaining defendant might bring 
facts sufficient to “shock the conscience” of the court.  Once again, 
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc. offers insight into the potential for 
success on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.228  Judge Chin denied 
NBC’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim stating that 
the “complaint also asserts a plausible claim that the police and NBC 
acted with deliberate indifference to Conradt’s rights and the risk of 
suicide, and that they acted in a manner and with a state of culpability 
that would shock one’s conscience.”229  Although it is true that this claim 
was never decided by a jury on the merits, it still shows that such a claim 
is possible.  It gives continued credence to the notion that cyber-vigilante 
groups working with law enforcement must be trained properly in order 
to avoid even the small chance that a constitutional claim could be 
successful. 
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3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims for Redress 
What happens if a defendant argues that his constitutional rights 
were violated, whereupon, the court finds the cyber-vigilante’s conduct 
was state action?  The defendant’s likely recourse would be to bring a § 
1983 civil rights claim against the government seeking redress.  Section 
1983 allows a claimant to bring a civil claim when he or she alleges that 
his or her constitutionally secured rights were violated by a person acting 
under the “color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.”230 
Section 1983 claims are only a problem if a court first decides that 
there is state action.  In such an instance, a “state or local government 
may be responsible . . . for the acts of a private entity if the state has 
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant 
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the private action must be 
deemed state action.”231  Obviously the language stating that “coercive 
power” and “significant encouragement” must be present, make this a 
pretty large hurdle to overcome.  However, once again it is important to 
note that the risks are too high to gamble on “what-ifs?”  Without proper 
training, a scenario could occur where the zeal to convict a cyber-
predator leads the government to enlist the help of a cyber-vigilante 
group, and thereafter, the government goes too far in its encouragement 
and control.  Should this scenario occur, it is possible that a defendant 
predator could bring a § 1983 claim against the government so long as 
the court first determined that a constitutional violation occurred. 
E. Cyber-Vigilantes Must Be Trained and Accountable to Law 
Enforcement Before Conducting Cyber-Predator Sting Operations 
This section addresses the possible solutions to the cyber-vigilante 
problem.  It is first important to understand the difficulty of setting a 
legal sting.  Audrey Rogers states: “To sufficiently establish a 
defendant’s intent, law enforcement must conduct sting operations in a 
manner that makes it abundantly clear that the defendant is aware that he 
is communicating with an apparent ‘child.’”232  Some of the other factors 
Rogers mentions are “time frame, quantity, and content of the 
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communications [which] are crucial in assessing the defendant’s 
intent.”233  Apart from admissibility implications, evidence must be 
gathered scrupulously to ensure the court can determine the intent of the 
cyber-vigilante.  This information is also necessary to prove whether or 
not a defendant was entrapped. 
In Dru Stevenson’s article, Entrapment by Numbers, he discusses the 
accountability of law enforcement and what it must do to ensure that 
their methods comport with the law.234  He specifically discusses the 
negative consequences of shoddy police work.235  Stevens states: “It is 
easy, both in the sense of being simple and cheap, for officers or agents 
to troll on-line chatrooms posing as adolescents seeking sexual 
experimentation to lure pedophiles into extended correspondence while 
accumulating incriminating evidence from conversations and e-mailed 
images.”236  If it is easy and cheap for law enforcement to get involved in 
setting cyber-stings, it follows that it is also easy for private citizens to 
get involved.  Stevens concurs by stating that “[c]atching pedophiles can 
be done mostly from a cubicle in an office.”237  The proliferation of the 
Internet has created the cyber-vigilante phenomenon.238  Stevens states: 
“Historically this was not a problem because most individuals, even if 
they had the motivation to entrap others, did not have the resources to 
orchestrate a sting while protecting themselves from retaliation if 
caught. . . . The Internet has changed this, for better or worse . . . .”239  
And for better or for worse, cyber-vigilantes working with law 
enforcement must be properly trained. 
The evidence chain is intricate, and it is important that non-law-
enforcement personnel understand how it works.  Perverted Justice does 
appear to have a solid evidence gathering chain.240  However, as was 
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argued by the district attorney in Texas, even the best planned evidence 
can be compromised.241 
Finally, as Monica Shah states in her article about the influence of 
private parties in cyberspace: “If the case law on electronic vigilantism 
opens the door for other private entities to utilize aggressive investigative 
techniques to combat cybercrime, cyberspace will look much more like a 
gated community, a university patrolled by private police, or a 
department store with its own holding cell and armed guards.”242  
Although Shah’s article is mainly directed at cyber-vigilante hackers 
instead of groups like Perverted Justice, it is clear that one reason law 
enforcement utilizes cyber-vigilantes is because of their expertise.243  
Cyber-vigilantes can be a valuable asset to law enforcement so long as 
the training is accomplished first.  Law enforcement must always 
question first whether working with a cyber-vigilante group is in the 
department’s best interest.  If it is worth it, then the cyber-vigilante group 
must consent to training.  All the expertise is worthless if cyber-
vigilantes do not understand how to avoid the pitfalls of entrapment and 
other constitutional challenges. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Audrey Roger’s article on sting operations offers perspective in the 
way in which law enforcement should confront the phenomenon of 
cyber-sex crimes.244  She argues: “The ability to perpetrate crimes 
against children by use of the Internet is unprecedented . . . . Just as 
pedophiles have vastly increased access to children through the Internet, 
law enforcement must have access to pedophiles by means of sting 
operations.”245  There is a societal interest in catching cyber-predators 
before they prey on unsuspecting children; however, the methods used 
must be legal and follow strict evidentiary protocols.  Each jurisdiction is 
unique, and thus, specialized training is required.  When amateurs are  
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working with law enforcement, the standard must be equal to that of law 
enforcement officials. 
“[R]ights of suspected and convicted pedophiles are routinely 
violated and nobody cares.  The rules of evidence are stretched . . . 
[though] as a parent, . . . I’m okay with it.”246  This statement, although 
understandable, highlights the need for greater scrutiny on cyber-
vigilantes.  When cyber-vigilantes like Perverted Justice are trained and 
prepared, justice more often than not will prevail.  It is possible to secure 
a conviction on legal and ethical principals which leaves no doubt as to a 
convicted person’s guilt.  Therefore, cyber-vigilantes value to law 
enforcement increases in direct proportion to their preparedness. 
This Comment shows a need for cyber-vigilantes and government to 
understand the implications of working together.  Both parties must 
address the viability of such an option.  First, does law enforcement want 
to work with private citizens, and if so, what level of control should it 
assert over the operations?  Second, do cyber-vigilantes want to have an 
arms-length approach like that of Unknown user in Jarrett?  Both parties 
must make these determinations before they forge any type of 
relationship.  The stakes have been raised and cyber-vigilantes who work 
with law enforcement must be extremely careful to avoid constitutional 
pitfalls should they be classified as state actors.  Even though this 
Comment has addressed the unlikelihood that state action would be 
present in all such coordinated stings, it is in the best interest of both law 
enforcement and private cyber-vigilantes to be prepared.  Training 
should be required specifically when law enforcement works “hand in 
hand” with private parties.  The benefit of these extra precautions will be 
well worth it when all cyber-predators caught receive their just 
punishment. 
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